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Financial innovations are a common explanation of the rise in consumer credit and bankruptcies. To
evaluate this story, we develop a simple model that incorporates two key frictions: asymmetric information
about borrowers’ risk of default and a fixed cost to create each contract offered by lenders. Innovations
which reduce the fixed cost or ameliorate asymmetric information have large extensive margin effects
via the entry of new lending contracts targeted at riskier borrowers. This results in more defaults and
borrowing, as well as increased dispersion of interest rates. Using the Survey of Consumer Finance
and interest rate data collected by the Board of Governors, we find evidence supporting these predictions,
as the dispersion of credit card interest rates nearly tripled, and the share of credit card debt of lower
income households nearly doubled.
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Financial innovations are frequently cited as playing an essential role in the dramatic
rise in credit card borrowing over the past thirty years. By making intensive use of
improved information technology, it is argued that lenders were able to more accurately
price risk and to offer loans more closely tailored to the risk characteristics of different
groups (Mann 2006; Baird 2007). This dramatic expansion in credit card borrowing, in
turn, is thought to be a key force driving the surge in consumer bankruptcy ﬁlings and
unsecured borrowing (see Figure I) over the past thirty years (White 2007).
Surprisingly little theoretical work, however, has explored the implications of ﬁ-
nancial innovations for unsecured consumer loans, or compared these predictions to
the data. We address this gap by developing a simple incomplete markets model of
bankruptcy to analyze the qualitative implications of improved credit technology. Fur-
ther, to assess the model predictions, we assemble cross-sectional data on the evolution
of credit card debt in the U.S. from the early 1980s to the mid 2000s.
Our model incorporates two frictions which play a key role in shaping credit con-
tracts: asymmetric information about borrowers’ default risk and a ﬁxed cost to create
a credit contract. While asymmetric information is a common element of credit mar-
ket models, ﬁxed costs of contract design have been largely ignored by the academic
literature.1 This is surprising, as texts targeted at practitioners discuss signiﬁcant ﬁxed
costs associated with consumer credit contracts. According to Lawrence and Solomon
(2002), a prominent consumer credit handbook, the development of a consumer lending
product involves selecting the target market, researching the competition, designing the
terms and conditions of the product, (potentially) testing the product, forecasting prof-
itability, preparing formal documentation, as well as an annual review of the product.
Even after the initial launch, there are additional overhead costs, such as customer data
base maintenance, that vary little with the number of customers.2 Finally, it is worth not-
ing that ﬁxed costs are consistent with the observation that consumer credit contracts are
differentiated but rarely individual speciﬁc.
1Notable exceptions to this are Allard, Cresta, and Rochet (1997) and Newhouse (1996), who show that
ﬁxed costs can support pooling equilibria in insurance markets with a ﬁnite number of risk types.
2A similar process is described in other guidebooks. For example, Siddiqi (2006), outlines the develop-
ment process of credit risk scorecards which map individual characteristics (for a particular demographic
group) into a risk score. Large issuers develop their own “custom scorecards” based on customer data,
while some ﬁrms use purchased data. Because of changes to the economic environment, scorecards are
frequently updated, so there is not one “true” risk mapping that once developed is a public good.
1We incorporate these frictions into a two-period model that builds on the classic con-
tribution of Jaffee and Russell (1976). The economy is populated by a continuum of
two-period lived risk-neutral borrowers. Borrowers differ in their probabilities of re-
ceiving a high endowment realization in the second period. To offer a lending contract,
which speciﬁes an interest rate, a borrowing limit and a set of eligible borrowers, an
intermediary incurs a ﬁxed cost. When designing loan contracts, lenders face an asym-
metric information problem, as they observe a noisy signal of a borrower’s true default
risk, while borrowers know their type. There is free entry into the credit market, and
the number and terms of lending contracts are determined endogenously. To address
well known issues of existence of competitive equilibrium with adverse selection, the
timing of the lending game builds on Hellwig (1987). This leads prospective lenders to
internalize how their entry decisions impact other lenders’ entry and exit decisions.
The equilibrium features a ﬁnite set of loan contracts, each “targeting” a speciﬁc pool
of risk types. The ﬁniteness of contracts follows from the assumption that a ﬁxed cost
is incurred per contract offered, so that some “pooling” is necessary to spread the ﬁxed
cost across multiple types of borrowers. Working against larger pools is that bigger
pools requires a broader range of risk types, which leads to larger gaps between the
average default rate of the pool and the default risk of the least risky pool members.
With free entry of intermediaries, these two forces lead to a ﬁnite set of contracts for any
(strictly positive) ﬁxed cost.
We use this framework to analyze the qualitative implications of three ﬁnancial inno-
vations which may have had a signiﬁcant impact on credit card lending over the past
thirty years: (i) reductions in the ﬁxed cost of creating contracts; (ii) increased accuracy
ofthelenders’predictionsofborrowers’defaultrisk(whichmitigatesadverseselection);
and (iii) a reduced cost of lenders’ funds. As we discuss in Section 1.1, the ﬁrst two inno-
vationscapturetheideathatbetterandcheaperinformationtechnologyreducedthecost
of designing ﬁnancial contracts, and allowed lenders to more accurately price borrow-
ers’ risk. The third channel is motivated by the increased use of securitization (which
reduced lenders’ costs of funds) as well as lower costs of servicing consumer loans as a
result of improved information technology.
All three forms of ﬁnancial innovation lead to signiﬁcant changes in the extensive
margin of who has access to risky loans. The measure of households offered risky loans
depends on both the number of risky contracts and the size of each pool. Intuitively,
ﬁnancial innovation makes the lending technology more productive, which leads to it
2being used more intensively to sort borrowers into smaller pools. Holding the num-
ber of contracts ﬁxed, this reduces the number of households with risky borrowing.
However, improved lending technology makes the marginal contract more attractive to
borrowers by lowering the break-even interest rate. Thus, sufﬁciently large ﬁnancial
innovations lead to the entry of new contracts, targeted at riskier types than served by
existing contracts. In the model, the new contract margin dominates the local effect of
smaller pools, so that new contracts lead to an increase in the number of borrowers.
Aggregate borrowing and defaults are driven by the extensive margin, with more
borrowers leading to more borrowing and defaults. Changes in the size and number
of contracts induced by ﬁnancial innovations result in more disperse interest rates, as
rates for low risk borrowers decline, while high risk borrowers gain access to high rate
loans. Smaller pools lower the average gap between a household’s default risk and their
interest rate, which leads to improved risk-based pricing. This pricing effect is especially
pronounced when the accuracy of the lending technology improves, as fewer high risk
borrowers are misclassiﬁed as low risk.
One dimension along which improved risk assessment differs from the other inno-
vations is the average default rate of borrowers. On the one hand, whenever the num-
ber of contracts increases, households with riskier observable characteristics gain access
to risky loans. On the other hand, an increase in signal accuracy reduces the number
of misclassiﬁed high risk types who are offered loans targeted at low risk borrowers,
which acts to lower defaults. In our numerical example, these two effects roughly offset
each other, so that improved risk assessment leaves the average default rate of borrowers
essentially unchanged.
To evaluate these predictions, we examine changes in the distribution of credit card
debt and interest rates, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finance from 1983 to
2004. We ﬁnd that the model predictions line up surprisingly well with trends in the
credit card market. Using credit card interest rates as a proxy for product variety, we
ﬁnd that the number of different contracts tripled between 1983 and 2001. Even more
strikingly, the empirical density of credit card interest rates has become much “ﬂatter”.
While nearly 55% of households in 1983 reported the same interest rate (18%), by the
late 1990s no credit card rate was shared by more than 10% of households. This has been
accompanied by more accurate pricing of risk, as the relationship between observable
risk factors (such as recent delinquencies) and interest rates has tightened since the early
1980s. Finally, we ﬁnd that the largest increase in access to credit cards has been for
3lower income households, whose share of total credit card debt more than doubled.
The model also provides novel insights into competition in consumer credit markets.
In an inﬂuential paper, Ausubel (1991) argued that the fact that declines in the risk-free
rate during the 1980s did not lower average credit card rates was “... paradoxical within
the paradigm of perfect competition.” In contrast, this episode is consistent with our
competitive framework. The extensive margin is key to understanding why our predic-
tions differ from Ausubel (1991). A decline in the risk-free rate makes borrowing more
attractive, encouraging entry of new loan contracts that target riskier borrowers. This
pushes up the average risk premium, increasing the average borrowing rate. Thus, un-
like in the standard competitive lending model, the effect of a lower risk-free rate on
the average borrowing rate is ambiguous. This extensive margin channel also provides
insight into recent empirical work by Dick and Lehnert (2010). They ﬁnd that increased
competition, due to interstate bank deregulation, contributed to the rise in bankruptcies.
Our model suggests a theoretical mechanism that could account for this observation. By
lowering barriers to interstate banking, deregulation acts to expand market size, which
effectively lowers the ﬁxed cost of contracts. In our framework, this leads to the exten-
sion of credit to riskier borrowers, resulting in more bankruptcies.
Our framework also has interesting implications for the debate over the welfare im-
plications of ﬁnancial innovations. In our environment, while ﬁnancial innovations in-
crease average (ex ante) welfare, they are not Pareto improving, as changes in the size
of each contract result in some households being pushed into higher interest rate con-
tracts. Moreover, the competitive equilibrium allocation is in general not efﬁcient, as
it features a greater product variety (more contracts) and less cross-subsidization than
would be chosen by a social planner who weights all households equally. As a result, in
equilibrium more resources are consumed by the ﬁnancial sector than is optimal.
This paper is related to the incomplete market framework of consumer bankruptcy of
Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007).3 Livshits, MacGee, and
Tertilt (2010) and Athreya (2004) use this framework to quantitatively evaluate alterna-
tive explanations for the rise in bankruptcies and borrowing. Both papers conclude that
changes in consumer lending technology, rather than increased idiosyncratic risk (e.g.,
increased earnings volatility), are the main factors driving the rise in bankruptcies.4 Un-
3Chatterjee, Corbae, and Rios-Rull (2010) and Chatterjee, Corbae, and Rios-Rull (2008) extend this
work and formalize how credit histories and credit scoring support the repayment of unsecured credit.
4Moss and Johnson (1999) argue, based on an analysis of borrowing trends, that the main cause of the
rise in bankruptcies is an increase in the share of unsecured credit held by lower income households.
4like our paper, they abstract from how ﬁnancial innovations change equilibrium loan
contracts and the pricing of borrowers default risk, and model ﬁnancial innovation in
an ad hoc way as a fall in the “stigma” of bankruptcy and lenders cost of funds.
Closely related in spirit is complementary work by Narajabad (2010), Sanchez (2010),
Athreya, Tam, andYoung(2008), andDrozdandNosal(2008). Narajabad(2010), Sanchez
(2010) and Athreya, Tam, and Young (2008) examine improvements in lenders’ ability to
predict default risk. In these papers, more accurate or cheaper signals lead to relatively
lower risk households borrowing more (i.e., a shift in the intensive margin), which in-
creases their probability of defaulting. Drozd and Nosal (2008) examine a reduction in
the ﬁxed cost incurred by the lender to solicit potential borrowers, which leads to lower
interest rates and increased competition for borrowers. Our work differs from these
papers in several key respects. First, we introduce a novel mechanism which operates
through the extensive rather than the intensive margin. Second, our tractable frame-
work allows us to analyze three different types of ﬁnancial innovations, and provides
interesting insight into the mechanisms linking lending environment and the degree of
dispersionincreditcontracts. Ouranalysisalsosuggestsnewinterpretationsof“compe-
tition” in consumer credit markets, the Ausubel (1991) puzzle, and the effects of relaxing
geographic restrictions to credit market competition.
Also related to this paper is recent work on competitive markets with adverse se-
lection. Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009), Einav, Jenkins, and Levin (2010) and Einav,
Jenkins, and Levin (2009) ﬁnd that subprime auto lenders face both moral hazard and
adverse selection problems when designing the pricing and contract structure of auto
loans, and that there are signiﬁcant returns to improved technology to evaluate loan ap-
plicants (credit scoring). Earlier work by ?) also found that adverse selection is present
in the credit card market. Recent work by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002), Guerrieri,
Shimer, and Wright (2010) and Bisin and Gottardi (2006) considers existence and efﬁ-
ciency of competitive equilibria with adverse selection. Our paper differs both in its
focus on ﬁnancial innovations, and incorporation of ﬁxed costs of creating contracts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 documents techno-
logical progress in the ﬁnancial sector over the last couple decades, Section 2 outlines
the general model. In Section 3 we characterize the set of equilibrium contracts, while
Section 4 examines the implications of ﬁnancial innovations. Section 5 compares these
predictions to data on the evolution of credit card borrowing. Section 6 concludes.
51.1 Financial Innovation
It is frequently asserted that the past thirty years have witnessed the diffusion and in-
troduction of numerous innovations in consumer credit markets (Mann 2006). Many of
these changes are attributed to improved information technology, which has led to in-
creased information sharing on borrowers between ﬁnancial intermediaries (Barron and
Staten 2003; Berger 2003; Evans and Schmalensee 1999). Here we brieﬂy outline several
important innovations in the credit card market (which largely accounts for the rise in
unsecured consumer debt): the development and diffusion of improved credit-scoring
techniques to identify and monitor creditworthy customers;5 increased use of comput-
ers to process information to facilitate customer acquisition, design credit card contracts,
and monitor repayment; and the increased securitization of credit card debt.6
Thedevelopmentofautomatedcreditscoringsystemsplayedanimportantroleinthe
growth of the credit card industry (Evans and Schmalensee 1999; Johnson 1992). Credit
scoring refers to the evaluation of the credit risk of loan applicants using historical data
and statistical techniques (Mester 1997). Credit scoring technology ﬁgures centrally in
credit card lending for two reasons. First, it decreased the cost of evaluating loan appli-
cations (Mester 1997). Second, it led to increased analysis of the relationship between
borrower characteristics and loan performance, and thus led to increased risk based
pricing. This resulted in substantial declines in interest rates for low risk customers and
increased rates for higher risk consumers (Barron and Staten 2003).7
Improvements in computational technology led to credit scoring becoming widely
used during the 1980s and 1990s (McCorkell 2002; Engen 2000; Asher 1994). The frac-
tion of large banks using credit scoring as a loan approval criteria increased from half in
1988 to nearly seven-eights in 2000. Further, the fraction of large banks using fully auto-
mated loan processing (for direct loans) increased from 12 percent in 1988 to nearly 29
percent in 2000 (Installment Lending Report 2000). While larger banks are more likely
than smaller banks to create their own credit scores, banks of any size have been using
this technology by purchasing scores from other providers (Berger 2003). In fact, credit
5The most prominent is Fair Isaac Cooperation, the developer of the FICO score, who started building
credit scoring systems in the late 1950s. In 1975 Fair Isaac introduced the ﬁrst behavior scoring system,
and in 1981 introduced the Fair Isaac credit bureau scores. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair Isaac.
6While references to ﬁnancial innovation are common, few empirical studies attempt to quantitatively
document its extent: “A striking feature of this literature [...] is the relative dearth of empirical studies that
[...] provide a quantitative analysis of ﬁnancial innovation.” (Frame and White (2004))
7A similar ﬁnding holds for small business loans, where bank adoption of credit scoring led to the
extension of credit to “marginal applicants” at higher interest rates (Berger, Frame, and Miller 2005).
6bureaus have increasingly collected information on borrowers and have been selling the
information to lenders. The number of credit reports issued has increased dramatically
from 100 million in 1970 to 400 million in 1989, to more than 700 million today. The
information in these ﬁles is widely used by lenders (as an input into credit scoring), as
more than two million credit reports are sold daily by U.S. credit bureaus (Riestra 2002).8
The reduction in information processing costs may have also lowered the cost of de-
signing and offering unsecured loan contracts. As discussed earlier, deciding on the
target market and terms of credit products is typically data intensive as it involves sta-
tistical analysis of large data sets. In addition, the cost of maintaining and processing
different loan products is also information intensive, so that improved information tech-
nology both reduced the ﬁxed cost of maintaining differentiated credit products and
lowered the cost of servicing each account.
There has also been signiﬁcant innovations in how credit card companies ﬁnance
their operations. Beginning in 1987, credit card companies began to securitize credit
card receivables. Securitization increased rapidly, with over a quarter of bank credit
card balances securitized by 1991, and nearly half by 2005 (Federal Reserve Board 2006).
Thishasledtoreducedﬁnancingcostsforcreditcardlenders(Furletti2002;Getter2008).
2 Model Environment
We analyze a two-period small open economy populated by a continuum of borrow-
ers, who face stochastic endowment in period 2. Markets are incomplete as only non-
contingent contracts can be issued. However, borrowers can default on contracts by
paying a bankruptcy cost. Financial intermediaries can access funds at an (exogenous)
risk-free interest rate r, incur a ﬁxed cost to design each ﬁnancial contract (character-
ized by a lending rate, a borrowing limit and eligibility requirement for borrowers) and
observe a (potentially) noisy signal of borrowers’ risk types.
8U.S. credit bureaus report borrowers’ payment history, debt and public judgments (Hunt 2006).
72.1 People
Borrowers live for two periods and are risk-neutral, with preferences represented by:
c1 + Ec2:
Each household receives the same deterministic endowment of y1 units of the consump-
tion good in period 1. The second period endowment, y2, is stochastic taking one of two
possible values: y2 2 fyh;ylg, where yh > yl. Households differ in their probability  of
receiving the high endowment yh. We identify households with their type , which is
distributed uniformly on [0;1].9 While each household knows their type, other agents
observe a public signal, , regarding a household’s type. With probability , this signal
is accurate:  = . With probability (1   ), the signal is an independent draw from the
 distribution (U[0;1]).
Throughout the paper, we assume that  <  q = 1
1+r, so that households always want
to borrow at the risk-free rate. Households’ borrowing, however, is limited by their
inability to commit to repaying loans.
2.2 Bankruptcy
There is limited commitment by borrowers who can choose to declare bankruptcy in
period 2. The cost of bankruptcy to a borrower is the loss of fraction  of the second-
period endowment. Lenders do not recover any funds from defaulting borrowers.
2.3 Financial Market
Financial markets are competitive. Financial intermediaries can borrow at the exoge-
nously given interest rate r and make loans to borrowers. Loans take the form of one
period non-contingent bond contracts. However, the bankruptcy option introduces a
partial contingency by allowing bankrupts to discharge their debts.
Financial intermediaries incur a ﬁxed cost  to offer each non-contingent lending
contract to (an unlimited number of) households. Endowment-contingent contracts are
9The characterization of equilibria is practically unchanged for an arbitrary support [a;b]  [0;1].
8ruled out (e.g., due to non-veriﬁability of the endowment realization). A contract is
characterized by (L;q;), where L is the face value of the loan, q is the per-unit price of
the loan (so that qL is the amount advanced in period 1 in exchange for a promise to pay
L in period 2), and  is the minimal public signal that makes a household eligible for
the contract. In equilibrium, the bond price incorporates the ﬁxed cost of offering the
contract (so that the equilibrium operating proﬁt of each contract equals the ﬁxed cost)
and the default probability of borrowers. We exempt the risk-free contract (yl;q;0)
from paying the entry cost.10 Households can accept only one loan, so intermediaries
know the total amount borrowed.
2.4 Timing
The timing of events is critical for supporting pooling across unobservable types in equi-
librium (see Hellwig (1987)). The key idea is that “cream-skimming” deviations are
made unproﬁtable if pooling contracts can exit the market in response.
1.a. Intermediaries pay ﬁxed costs  of entry and announce their contracts — the stage
ends when no intermediary wants to enter given the contracts already announced.
1.b Households observe all contracts and choose which one(s) to apply for (realizing
that some intermediaries may choose to exit the market).
1.c Intermediaries decide whether to advance loans to qualiﬁed applicants or exit the
market.
1.d Lenders who chose to stay in the market notify qualiﬁed applicants.
1.e Borrowers who received loan offers pick their preferred loan contract. Loans are
advanced.
2.a Households realize their endowments and make default decisions.
2.b Non-defaulting households repay their loans.
10Inanearlierversionofthepaper, wetreatedtherisk-freecontractsymmetrically. Thisdoesnotchange
the key model predictions, but complicates the exposition and computational algorithms.
92.5 Equilibrium
We study (pure strategy) Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the extensive form game de-
scribed in Subsection 2.4. In the complete information case, the object of interest become
Subgame Perfect Equilibria, and we are able to characterize the complete set of equilib-
rium outcomes. In the asymmetric information case, we characterize “pooling” equilib-
ria where all risky contracts have the same face value (i.e. equilibria that are similar to
the full information equilibria) and then numerically verify existence and uniqueness.
Details are given in Section 3.2.
In all cases, we emphasize equilibrium outcomes (the set of contracts offered and
accepted in equilibrium) rather than the full set of equilibrium strategies. While the
timing of the game facilitates existence of pooling equilibria, it also makes a complete
description of equilibrium strategies quite involved. The key idea is that the timing al-
lows us to support pooling in equilibrium by preventing “cream skimming” — offering
a slightly distorted contract which only “good” types would ﬁnd appealing, leaving
the “bad” types with the incumbent contract. Allowing the incumbent to exit if such
cream-skimming is attempted (at stage 1.c) thus preempts cream skimming, so long as
the incumbent earns zero proﬁt on the contract. For tractability, we simply describe the
set of contracts offered in equilibrium.
An equilibrium (outcome) is a set of active contracts K∗ = f(qk;Lk;k)k=1;:::;Ng and
consumers’ decision rules (;;K) 2 K for each type (;) such that
1. Given f(qk;Lk;k)k̸=jg and consumers’ decision rules, each (potential) bank j max-
imizes proﬁts by making the following choice: to enter or not, and if it enters, it
chooses contract (qj;Lj;j) and incurs ﬁxed cost .
2. Given any K, a consumer of type  with public signal  chooses which contract to
accept so as to maximize expected utility. Note that a consumer with public signal
 can choose a contract k only if  > k.
3 Equilibrium Characterization
We begin by examining the environment with complete information regarding house-
holds’ risk types ( = 1). With full information, characterizing the equilibrium is rela-
tively simple since the public signal always corresponds to the true type. This case is
10interesting for several reasons. First, this environment corresponds to a static version
of recent papers (i.e. Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) and Chatterjee et al. (2007))
which abstract from adverse selection. The key difference is that the ﬁxed cost gener-
ates a form of “pooling”, so households face actuarially unfair prices. Second, we can
analyze technological progress in the form of lower ﬁxed costs. Finally, abstracting from
adverse selection helps illustrate the workings of the model. In Section 3.2 we show that
including asymmetric information leads to remarkably similar equilibrium outcomes.
3.1 Perfectly Informative Signals
In the full information environment, the key friction is that each lending contract re-
quires a ﬁxed cost  to create. Since each borrower type is inﬁnitesimal relative to this
ﬁxed cost, lending contracts have to pool different types to recover the cost of creating
the contract. This leads to a ﬁnite set of contracts being offered in equilibrium.
Contracts can vary along two dimensions: the face value L, which the household
promises to repay in period 2, and the per-unit price q of the contract. Our ﬁrst result is
that all possible lending contracts are characterized by one of two face values. The face
value of the risk-free contract equals the bankruptcy cost in the low income state, so that
households are always willing to repay. The risky contracts’ face value is the maximum
such that borrowers repay in the high income state. Contracts with lower face value are
not offered in equilibrium since, if (risk-neutral) households are willing to borrow at a
given price, they want to borrow as much as possible at that price. Formally:
Lemma 3.1. There are at most two loan sizes offered in equilibrium: A risk-free contract with
L = yl and risky contracts with L = yh.
Risky contracts differ in their bond prices and eligibility criteria. Since the eligibility
decision is made after the ﬁxed cost has been incurred, lenders are willing to accept any
household who yields non-negative operating proﬁts. Hence, a lender offering a risky
loan at price q rejects all applicants with risk type below some cut-off  such that the
expected return from the marginal borrower is zero: qL   qL = 0, where qL is the
expected present value of repayment and qL is the amount advanced to the borrower.
This cut-off rule is summarized in the next Lemma:
Lemma 3.2. Every lender offering a risky contract at price q rejects an applicant iff the expected
proﬁt from that applicant is negative. The marginal type accepted into the contract is  =
q
q.
11This implies that the riskiest household accepted by a risky contract makes no con-
tribution to the overhead cost . We order the risky contracts by the riskiness of the
clientele served by the contract, from the least to the most risky.
Lemma 3.3. Finitely many risky contracts are offered in equilibrium. Contract n serves borrow-
ers in the interval [n;n−1), where 0 = 1, n = 1   n
√
2
yhq, at bond price qn = qn.
Proof. If a contract yields strictly positive proﬁt (net of ), then a new entrant will enter,
offering a better price that attracts the borrowers from the existing contract. Hence, each








 q   (n−1   n)qn
)
:
Using qn = nq and L = yh from Lemmata 3.1 and 3.2, and solving for n, we obtain
n = n−1  
√
2




Lemma 3.3 shows that the measure of households pooled in each contract increases
in the ﬁxed cost  and the risk-free interest rate, and decreases in the bankruptcy pun-
ishment yh. If the ﬁxed cost is so large that
√
2
yh q > 1, then no risky loans are offered.
The number of risky contracts offered in equilibrium is pinned down by the house-
holds’ participation constraints. Given a choice between several risky contracts, house-
holds always prefer the contract with the highest q. Thus, a household’s decision prob-
lem reduces to choosing between the best risky contract they are eligible for and the
risk-free contract. The value to type  of contract (q;L) is
v(q;L) = qL +  [(yh   L) + (1   )(1   )yl];
and the value of the risk-free contract is
v( q;yl) =  qyl +  [yh + (1   )yl   yl]:
A household of type  accepts risky contract (q;L) only if v(q;L)  v( q;yl), which
reduces to










Note that the right-hand side of equation (3.1) is increasing in . Hence, if the participa-
tion constraint is satisﬁed for the highest type in the interval, n−1, it will be satisﬁed for
12any household with  < n−1. Solving for the equilibrium number of contracts, N, thus
involves ﬁnding the ﬁrst risky contract n for which this constraint binds for n−1.
Lemma 3.4. The equilibrium number of contracts offered, N, is the largest integer smaller than:









If the expression is negative, then no risky contracts are offered.
Proof. We need to ﬁnd the riskiest contract for which the household at the top of the
interval participates: i.e. the largest n such that risk type n−1 prefers contract n to the
risk-free contract. Substituting for contract n in the participation constraint (3.1) of n−1:









Using qn = n q and n = 1   n
√
2















The following theorem characterizes the entire set of equilibrium contracts. It follows
directly from Lemmata 3.1-3.4.
Theorem 3.5. If ( q   )[yh   yl] >  qyh
√
2
yh q, then there exists N  1 risky contracts char-
acterized by: L = yh, n = 1   n
√
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. One risk-free contract is offered at price  q to all households with  < N.
133.2 Incomplete Information
We now characterize equilibria with asymmetric information. We focus on “pooling”
equilibria which closely resemble the compete information equilibria of Section 3.1.11
These “pooling” equilibria feature one risk-free contract with loan size L = yl and
ﬁnitely many risky contracts with L = yh, each targeted at a subset of households with
sufﬁciently high public signal . While we are unable to provide a complete characteri-
zation of equilibria with asymmetric information for arbitrary parameter values, we are
able to numerically verify that the “pooling” equilibrium is in fact the unique equilib-
rium for the parameter values we consider.
Themaincomplicationintroducedbyasymmetricinformationarisesfrommislabeled
borrowers. The behavior of borrowers with incorrectly high public signals ( > ) is
easy to characterize, since they always accept the contract offered to their public type.
Customers with incorrectly low public signals, however, may prefer the risk-free con-
tract over the risky contract for their public type. While this is not an issue in the best
loan pool (as no customer is misclassiﬁed downwards), the composition of riskier pools
(and thus the pricing) may be affected by the “opt-out” of misclassiﬁed low risk types.
For each risky contract, denote ^ n the highest true type willing to accept that contract





Since ^ n is increasing in qn, lower bond prices result in a higher opt-out rate. Households
who decline risky loans (i.e., those with public signal  2 [n;n−1) and true type  > ^ n)
borrow via the risk free contract. Figure II illustrates the set of equilibrium contracts.
Despite this added complication, the structure of equilibrium loan contracts remain
remarkably similar to the full information case. Strikingly, as the following lemma es-






11In contrast, a “separating” equilibrium would include smaller risky “separating” loans targeted at
mislabeled borrowers who were misclassiﬁed into high-risk contracts. Note that our notion of “pooling”
is not quite standard, as it allows mislabeled types to decline the risky “pooling” loan they are offered,
and join the risk-free loan pool.
14Proof. This result follows from the free entry and uniform type distribution assump-
tions. Consider an arbitrary risky contract. For any public type , let E() denote
expected proﬁts. Note that the lowest public type accepted , yields zero expected prof-
its. Free entry implies the contract satisﬁes the zero proﬁt condition, so total proﬁts from
the interval of public types between  and  +  must equal .
∫ 
0
E( + )d =  (3.3)
With probability  the signal is correct (so  = ), while with probability 1  the signal
is incorrect, in which case types  > ^  choose to opt out. To determine the proﬁt from
type +, note that the fraction of households that do not opt out is +(1 )^ . Hence:
E( + ) = ( + (1   )^ )E( + j < ^ )
= ( + (1   )^ )[qE(j =  + ; < ^ )yh   qnyh]:
The additional repayment probability from public type  +  over type  is 
+(1−)^ ,
which is simply the probability that the signal is correct times the difference in repay-
ment rates corrected for the measure that accepts the contract ( + (1   )^ ). Thus:
E( + ) = ( + (1   )^ )
[
q
 + (1   )^ 
yh + q (E(j = ; < ^ ))yh   qnyh
]
:
At the bottom cutoff,  <  +   ^ . Thus, the last two terms equal the expected proﬁt
from public signal :
E( + ) = ( + (1   )^ )
[
q




Since the expected proﬁt for type  is zero, this simpliﬁes to E( + ) = qyh: Plug-
ging this into equation (3.3), we have
∫ 




The expression for the length of the interval (of public types) served closely resembles
the complete information case in Lemma 3.3. The only difference is that less precise
signals increase the interval length by the multiplicative factor
√
1=. This is intuitive,
as the average proﬁtability of a type decreases as the signal worsens, and thus larger
pools are needed to cover the ﬁxed cost. What is surprising is that the measure of public
types targeted by each contract is the same, especially since the fraction who accept
15varies due to misclassiﬁed borrowers opting out. As the proof of Lemma 3.6 illustrates,
this is driven by two effects that exactly offset each other: lower-ranked contracts have
fewer borrowers accepting, but make up for it by higher proﬁt per borrower. As a result,
the proﬁtability of a type ( + ) is the same across contracts (= qyh).
As in the full information case, the number of risky contracts offered in equilibrium
is pinned down by the household participation constraints. Type  is willing to accept
risky contract (q;L) whenever v(q;L)  v( q;yl). This also implies that if the n-th risky
contract (qn;yh;n) is offered, then ^ n > n−1. That is, no accurately labeled customer
ever opts out of a risky contract in equilibrium. Combining Lemma 3.6 with the zero
marginal proﬁt condition, one can derive a relationship between the bond price and the
cutoff public type for each contract. The next theorem summarizes this result.
Theorem 3.7. Finitely many risky contracts are offered in a “pooling” equilibrium. The n-
th contract (qn;yh;n) serves borrowers with public signals in the interval [n;n−1), where
0 = 1, and n = 1   n
√
2
qyh. The bond price qn solves




where ^ n is given by equation (3.2). If the participation constraints of mislabeled borrowers do
not bind (^ n = 1), this simpliﬁes to qn = q
(




To verify that this “pooling” allocation is indeed an equilibrium, we need to verify
that there is no possible proﬁtable entry of new (separating) contracts. Speciﬁcally, one
needs to rule out “cream skimming” deviations targeted at borrowers whose public sig-
nals are lower than their true type. Such deviation contracts necessarily involve smaller
loans offered at better terms, since public types that are misclassiﬁed downwards must
prefer them to the risk-free contract and true types must prefer the risky contract they
are eligible for. In the numerical examples, we computationally verify that such devia-
tions are not proﬁtable. The ﬁxed cost plays an essential role here, as it forces potential
entrant to “skim” enough people to cover the ﬁxed cost. See Appendix A for a detailed
description of both the possible deviation and veriﬁcation procedure.
By numerically ruling out these deviations we establish not only that “pooling” is an
equilibrium, but also that it is the unique equilibrium. Given our timing assumptions, if
a “separating” equilibrium existed, it would rule out “pooling” as an equilibrium, since
“separating” is preferred by the best customers (highest ’s). The uniqueness within the
16class of “pooling” equilibria follows from the very same argument that guarantees the
uniqueness of equilibria under complete information (Section 3.1).
4 Implications of Financial Innovations
In this section, we analyze the model implications for three channels via which ﬁnancial
innovations could impact consumer credit: (i) a decline in the ﬁxed cost , (ii) a decrease
in the cost of loanable funds  q, and (iii) an improvement in the accuracy of the public
signal . Given the stylized nature of our model, we focus on the qualitative predictions
for total borrowing, defaults, interest rates and the composition of borrowers. We ﬁnd
that ﬁnancial innovations signiﬁcantly impacts the extension margin of who has access
to credit. ‘Large enough” innovations lead to more credit contracts, access to risky loans
for higher risk households, more disperse interest rates, more borrowing and defaults.
Each of the innovations we consider have different implications for changes in the ratio
of overhead cost to total loans and the average default rate of borrowers.
4.1 Decline in the Fixed Cost
It is widely agreed that information processing costs have declined signiﬁcantly over the
past 30 years (Jorgenson 2001). This has facilitated the increased use of data intensive
analysis to design credit scorecards for new credit products (McNab and Taylor 2008).
A natural way of capturing this in our model is via lower ﬁxed costs, . We use the an-
alytical results from Section 3.1, as well as an illustrative numerical example (see Figure
III), to explore how the model predictions vary with .12 For simplicity, we focus on the
full information case ( = 1). Qualitatively similar results hold when  < 1.
A decline in the ﬁxed cost of creating a contract, , impacts the set of equilibrium
contracts via both the measure served by each contract and the number of contracts (see
Figure III.A and B). Since each contract is of length
√
2
yhq, holding the number of con-
tracts ﬁxed, a reduction in  reduces the total measure of borrowers. However, a large
enough decline in the ﬁxed cost lowers the borrowing rates for (previously) marginal
borrowers enough that they prefer the risky to the risk-free contract. This increase in the
12The example parameters are  = 0:75; = 0:25;yl = 0:6;yh = 3;  r = 0:04, with  2 [0:0005;0:00001].
17number of contracts introduces discontinuous jumps in the measure of risky borrow-
ers. Globally (for sufﬁciently large changes in ), the extensive margin of an increase in
the number of contracts dominates, so the measure of risky borrowers increases. This
follows from Theorem 3.5, as the measure of risky borrowers is bounded by:











 qyh   (yh   yl)
;




 qyh   (yh   yl)

:
Note that the global effect follows from the fact that both the left and the right bound-
aries of the interval are decreasing in .
Since all risky loans have the same face value L = yh, variations in  affect credit ag-
gregates primarily through the extensive margin of how many households are eligible.
As a result, borrowing and defaults inherit the “saw-tooth” pattern of risky borrowers
(see Figure III.C, D and E). However, the fact that new contracts extend credit to riskier
borrowers leads (globally) to defaults increasing faster than borrowing. The reason is
that the amount borrowed, qnL, for a new contract is lower than for existing contracts
since the bond price is lower. Hence, the amount borrowed rises less quickly than the
measure of borrowers (compare Figure III.C with III.D). Conversely, the extension of
credit to riskier borrowers causes total defaults (
∫ 1
N(1   )d = 1=2   N +
2
N
2 ) to in-
crease more quickly, leading to higher default rates (see Figure III.E).
The rise in defaults induced by lower  is accompanied by a tighter relationship be-
tween individual risk and borrowing interest rates. The shrinking of each contract inter-
val lowers the gap between the average default rate in each pool and each borrower’s
default risk, leading to more accurate risk-based pricing. As the number of contracts
increases, interest rates become more disperse and the average borrowing interest rate
slightly increases. This reﬂects the extension of credit to riskier borrowers at high inter-
est rates, while interest rates on existing contracts fall (see Figure III.F).
There are two key points to take from Figure III.G, which plots total overhead costs as
a percentage of borrowing. First, overhead costs in the example are very small. Second,
even though  falls by a factor of 50, total overhead costs (as % of debt) fall only by a
factor of 7. The smaller decline in overheads costs is due to the decrease in the measure
served by each contract, so that each borrower has to pay a larger share of the overhead
costs. This suggests that cost of operations of banks (or credit card issuers) may not be a
good measure of technological progress in the banking sector.
18The example also highlights a novel mechanism via which interstate bank deregula-
tion could impact consumer credit markets. In our model, an increase in market size is
analogous to a lower , since what matters is the ratio of the ﬁxed cost to the measure
of borrowers.13 Thus, the removal of geographic barriers to banking across geographic
regions, which effectively increases the market size, acts similarly to a reduction in 
and results in the extension of credit to riskier borrowers. This insight is of particular
interest given recent work by Dick and Lehnert (2010), who ﬁnd that interstate bank
deregulation (which they suggest increased competition) was a contributing factor to
the rise in consumer bankruptcies. Our example suggests that deregulation may have
led to increased bankruptcies not by increasing competition per se, but by facilitating
increased market segmentation by lenders. This (for large enough changes) leads to the
extension of credit to riskier borrowers, and thus higher bankruptcies. 14
4.2 Decline in Risk Free Rate
Another channel via which ﬁnancial innovations may have impacted consumer credit
is by lowering lenders cost of funds, either via securitization or lower loan processing
costs. To explore this channel, we vary the risk free interest rate in our model. For
simplicity, we again assume that  = 1, although similar results hold for  < 1.
The effect of a decline in the risk free rate is similar to a decline in ﬁxed costs. Once
again, the measure of borrowers depends upon how many contracts are offered and the
measure served by each contract. The length of each contract is
√
2
yhq, so a lower risk-
free interest rate leads to fewer borrowers per contract. Intuitively, the pass-through
of lower lending costs to the bond price qn makes the ﬁxed cost smaller relative to the
amount borrowed. Since the contract size depends on the trade-off between spreading
the ﬁxed cost across more households versus more cross-subsidization across borrow-
ers, the effective reduction in the ﬁxed cost induces smaller pools. Sufﬁciently large
declines in the risk-free rate increase the bond price (qn+1) of the marginal risky contract
by enough that borrowers prefer it to the risk-free contract. Since the global effect of ad-
ditional contracts dominates the local effect of smaller pools, sufﬁciently large declines
in the cost of funds lead to more households with risky loans (see Figure IV.A and B).
13Add scalar for density to interval length expression?
14Bank deregulation, as well as improved information technology, are likely explanations for the in-
creased role of large credit card providers who offer cards nationally, whereas early credit cards were
offered by regional banks.
19As with , credit aggregates are affected primarily through the extensive margin.
Since increasing the number of borrowers involves the extension of risky loans to riskier
borrowers, globally default rates rise with borrowing (see Figure IV.D and E). The av-
erage borrowing interest rate reﬂects the interaction between the pass-through of lower
cost of funds, the change in the composition of borrowers, and increased overhead costs.
For each existing contract, the lending rate declines by less than the risk-free rate since
with smaller pools the ﬁxed cost is spread across fewer borrowers. Working in the oppo-
site direction is the entry of new contracts with high interest rates, which increases the
maximum interest rate (see Figure IV.F). As a result, the average interest rate on risky
loans declines by less than 1 point in response a 4 point decline in the risk-free rate.
This example offers interesting insights into the debate over competition in the U.S.
credit card market. In an inﬂuential paper, Ausubel (1991) documented that the decline
in risk-free interest rates in the 1980s did not result in lower average credit card rates.
This led some to claim that the credit card industry was imperfectly competitive. In
contrast, EvansandSchmalensee(1999)arguedthatmeasurementissuesassociatedwith
ﬁxed costs of lending and the expansion of credit to riskier households during the late
1980simpliedthatAusubel’sobservationcouldbeconsistentwithacompetitivelending
market. Ourmodelformalizesthisidea.15 AsFigureIV.Fillustrates, adeclineintherisk-
free interest rate can leave the average interest rate largely unchanged, as cheaper credit
pulls in riskier borrowers, which increases the risk-adjusted interest rate.
4.3 Improvements in Signal Accuracy
The last innovation we consider is an improvement in lenders’ ability to assess borrow-
ers’ default risk. This is motivated by the improvement and diffusion of credit evalua-
tion technologies such as credit scoring (see Section 1.1), which maps naturally into an
increase in signal accuracy, . We again use our numerical example to help illustrate the
model predictions (see Figure V).16
Variations in signal accuracy () impact who is offered and who accepts risky loans.
As in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the measure offered a risky loan depends upon the number
and “size” of each contract. From Theorem 3.7, the measure eligible for each contract
15Brito and Hartley (1995) formalize a closely related mechanism, but with an exogenously ﬁxed num-
ber of contracts (risk categories), whereas in our model entry of new new contracts plays a key role.




qyh) is decreasing in  (see Figure V.B). Intuitively, higher  makes the credit tech-
nology more productive, which results in it being used more intensively to sort bor-
rowers into smaller pools. Higher  also pushes up bond prices (qn) by lowering the
number of misclassiﬁed high risk types eligible for each contract. This results in fewer
misclassiﬁed low risk households declining risky loans, narrowing the gap between the
measure accepting versus offered risky loans (see Figure V.C ). A sufﬁciently large in-
crease in  raises the bond price of the marginal risky contract enough that it is preferred
to the risk-free contract, resulting in a new contract being offered (see Figure V.A). Glob-
ally, the extensive margin of the number of contracts dominates, so the fraction of the
population offered a risky contract increases with signal accuracy.
More borrowers leads to an increase in debt. Similar to a decline in the ﬁxed cost
of contracts, an increase in the number of contracts involves the extension of credit to
higher risk (public) types, which increases defaults (Figure V.E). However, the impact
of higher  on the default rate of borrowers is more nuanced, as the extension of credit
to riskier public types is partially offset by fewer misclassiﬁed high risk types. These
offsetting effects can be seen in the expression for total defaults (Equation 4.1).
Defaults = 
(

















      
Misclassiﬁed
(4.1)
As  increases, the rise in the number of contracts (N) lowers N, which leads to more
defaults by correctly classiﬁed borrowers. However, higher  also lowers the number of
misclassiﬁed borrowers, who are on average riskier than the correctly classiﬁed. In our
example, this results in the average default rate of borrowers varying little in response to
, so that total defaults increase proportionally to the total number of (risky) borrowers.
Figure V.F shows that interest rates fan out as  rises, with the minimum rate declin-
ing, while the highest rises. This again reﬂects the offsetting effects of improved risk
assessment. By reducing the number of misclassiﬁed borrowers, default rates for ex-
isting contracts decline, which lowers the risk premium and thus the interest rate. The
maximum interest rate, in contrast, rises (globally) since increases in  lead to new con-
tracts targeted at riskier borrowers. Finally, since the average default rate for borrowers
is relatively invariant to , so to is the average risk premium (and thus the average inter-
est rate). Overall, higher  leads to a tighter relationship between (ex-post) individual
default risk and (ex-ante) borrowing interest rates.
21Total overhead costs (as a percentage of risky borrowing) increase with  (Figure
V.G), which reﬂects more intensive use of the lending technology induced by its in-
creased accuracy. As a consequence, equating technological progress with reduced cost
of lending can be misleading, since in this example technological progress (in the form
of an increase in ) causes an increase in overhead costs.
4.4 Financial Innovations and Welfare
The welfare effects of the rise in consumer borrowing and bankruptcies, and ﬁnancial
innovations in general, have been the subject of much discussion (Tufano 2003; Athreya
2001). In our model, we ﬁnd that ﬁnancial innovations improve ex-ante welfare, as
the gains from increased access to credit outweigh higher deadweight default costs and
overhead lending costs. However, ﬁnancial innovations are not Pareto improving, as
some borrowers are disadvantaged ex-post.
The natural welfare measure in our model is the ex-ante utility of a borrower before
their type (;) is realized. As panel H of Figures III, IV and V show, all three ﬁnancial
innovations increase welfare. The impact of “large” innovations (which induce entry
of additional contracts) is intuitive, as borrowers who switch from the risk-free to risky
contracts beneﬁt (otherwise they would not switch). The ”local” welfare effects are less
straightforward, as ﬁnancial innovations both reduce access to risky borrowing (which
lowers welfare) and lower risky borrowing rates (which increase welfare). Reduced ac-
cess, however, has a small welfare effect, since the marginal borrowers (who lose access)
are (relatively) risky types. As a result, their loss is largely offset by a lower average
default premium which reduces other borrowers interest rates. Overall, this means that
the direct effect of innovation on borrowing rates dominate.
While ﬁnancial innovations increase ex-ante welfare, they are not Pareto improving as
they generate both winners and losers ex-post (i.e., once people know their type (;)).
When the length of the contract intervals shrink, the worst borrowers in each contract
(those near the bottom cut-off n) are pushed into a higher interest rate contract. Thus,
these borrowers always lose (locally) from ﬁnancial innovation. While this effect holds
withandwithoutasymmetricinformation, improvedsignalaccuracyaddsanadditional
channel via which innovation creates losers. As  increases, some borrowers who were
previously misclassiﬁed with high public signal become correctly classiﬁed, and as a
result face higher interest rates (or, no access to risky loans). Conversely, borrowers who
22were previously misclassiﬁed “down” beneﬁt from better borrowing terms as do (on
average) correctly classiﬁed risk types.
Although ﬁnancial innovations are welfare improving, the competitive equilibrium
allocation is not constrained efﬁcient. Formally, we consider the problem of a social
planner that maximizes the ex-ante utility of borrowers before types (;) are realized,
subject to the technological constraint that each (risky) lending contract offered incurs
ﬁxed cost .17 The constrained efﬁcient allocation features fewer contracts, each serving
more borrowers, than the competitive equilibrium. Rather than using the zero expected
proﬁt condition to pin down the eligibility set (Proposition 3.2), the planner extends the
eligibility set of each contract to include borrowers who deliver negative expected prof-
its while making the best type (within the contract eligibility set) indifferent between the
risky contract and the risk-free contract (i.e. equation (3.1) binds). Since this allocation
“wastes” fewer resources on ﬁxed costs, average consumption is higher.
This inefﬁciency is not directly related to adverse selection problems, as the equilib-
rium is inefﬁcient even in the perfect information case.18 Instead, the source of this inef-
ﬁciency is analogous to the business stealing effect of entry models with ﬁxed costs (e.g.,
see Mankiw and Whinston (1986) where the competitive equilibrium suffers from ex-
cess entry. Borrowers would like to commit to larger pools (greater cross-subsidization)
ex-ante (before their type has been realized); but ex post some borrowers prefer the com-
petitive contracts. This highlights the practical challenges of policies to improve upon
the competitive allocation. Any such policy would make some borrowers worse off and
would essentially require a regulated monopolist lender.
5 Comparing the Model Predictions to the Data
We now ask whether the model predictions for the effect of ﬁnancial innovations (re-
duced cost of contract design, more accurate risk assessment, and reduced funding
costs) are consistent with developments in the unsecured consumer credit market over
the past thirty years. Given the rich cross-sectional predictions of our model, we focus
primarily on the degree of segmentation of consumer credit and changes in borrowing
17See the supplemental web appendix for the explicit representation and solution characterization.
18Since borrowers are risk-neutral there are no direct welfare gains from increased ex post cross-
subsidization across borrowers. Thus, the inefﬁciency differs from the standard mechanism in competi-
tive equilibria with adverse selection due to inefﬁcient risk-sharing, as in Prescott and Townsend (1984).
23across income groups. Our conclusion is that the key model predictions for technologi-
cal innovations – increased market segmentation, improved risk-based pricing and the
extension of credit to riskier households – are borne out in the data.
5.1 Aggregate Trends
As discussed in Section 4, the model predicts that “sufﬁciently large” ﬁnancial innova-
tions (i.e. increases in , decreases in  or  q) increase debt and defaults. This is consis-
tent with the surge in consumer bankruptcies and unsecured borrowing observed in the
U.S. during the past thirty years (see Figure I). The available data on aggregate over-
head costs, however, suggest that a decline in the ﬁxed cost alone is not the sole driving
force. The model predicts that reductions in the ﬁxed cost lead to a decline in overhead
costs as a percent of borrowing, while improvements in signal accuracy or reduced costs
of funds lead to higher overhead costs. The closest empirical analog to overhead costs
is the ratio of non-interest costs to total assets. Berger (2003) reports that non-interest
costs of U.S. commercial banks rose from roughly 3% of total assets in the early 1980s to
3.5% by the mid 1990s. This is consistent, with either reduced funding costs  q, or more
accurate risk assessment (increases in ), but not a decline in .
5.2 Cross-Sectional Predictions and the Data
The model has interesting cross-sectional implications for the impact of ﬁnancial inno-
vations on the degree of credit market segmentation, the relationship between borrower
risk and interest rates and the extensive margin of who has access to borrowing.19
To evaluate these predictions, we examine U.S. data on the distribution of credit card
debt and interest rates over the 1980s and 1990s. We focus on credit cards for several
reasons. First, most unsecured borrowing occurs via credit cards (Livshits, MacGee,
and Tertilt 2010). Second, while credit cards are a recent innovation (dating from the mid
1960s), they have become widely used. Ownership of a bank credit card has increased
from 43% of households in 1983 to 72% in 2004 (see Table 1), while the fraction carrying
a positive balance has nearly doubled from about 22% in 1983 to 40% in 2004. Third, as
19The model-implied changes refer to those that result from an increase in , a decrease in  or lower
cost of funds. We focus on changes that are large enough to increase the number of contracts offered, i.e.
we ignore small changes that sometimes (locally) have the opposite implications.
24Table 1: Survey of Consumer Finances
1983 1989 1995 1998 2001 2004
% Population has card 43% 56% 66% 68% 73% 72%
% Population has balance 22% 29% 37% 37% 39% 40%
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on SCF
discussed in Section 1.1, improvements in information technology are frequently cited
as a key factor in the growth and evolution of the credit card industry.20
We focus on three key model predictions of the effect of ﬁnancial innovation: (i) an
increase in the “variety” (number) of credit contracts, (ii) an increase in risk-based pric-
ing, i.e. interest rates that are more ﬁnely tailored to people’s types, and (iii) increased
access to borrowing for more risky people. We ﬁnd that all three model predictions for
the impact of ﬁnancial innovations are broadly consistent with the data.
5.2.1 Increased Variety in Consumer Credit Contracts
All three ﬁnancial innovations that we consider predict an increase in the number of
risky contracts. In our model, this increase in product variety appears as an increase in
the number of different interest rates offered. We ﬁnd a similar trend in the data: the
number of different credit card interest rates offered to consumers has increased, while
the distribution (across borrowers) has become more dispersed.
We use data from the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) on the interest rate paid on
credit card accounts to count the number of different interest rates reported in various
years. The second and third columns of Table 2 show that the number of different inter-
est rates reported nearly tripled between 1983 and 2004.21 As the table shows, this has
been accompanied by increased dispersion of rates across households: the coefﬁcient of
variation (CV) also nearly tripled.22
20Improvements in information technology which reduce operating costs are likely to have a large im-
pactofcreditcardssinceoperatingcostsaccountfornearly60percentofthecostsofcreditcardoperations,
compared to less than 20 percent of mortgage lending (Canner and Luckett (1992)).
21This likely understates the increase in variety, as Furletti (2003) and Furletti and Ody (2006) argue
that credit card providers make increased use of features such as annual fees and purchase insurance to
differentiate their products, while Narajabad (2010) documents increased dispersion in credit limits
22Since we are comparing trends in dispersion of a variable with a changing mean (due to lower risk-
free rates), we report the coefﬁcient of variation (CV) instead of the variance of interest rates.
25Table 2: Credit Card Interest Rates, SCF
Year # of Rates # of Rates CV CV
All Households (HH with B > 0) All HH (HH with B > 0)
1983 78 47 0.22 0.21
1995 142 118 0.30 0.32
1998 136 115 0.32 0.35
2001 222 155 0.37 0.40
2004 211 145 0.56 0.56
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Survey of Consumer Finance.
We also ﬁnd increased dispersion in borrowing interest rates from survey data col-
lected from banks by the Board of Governors on 24-month consumer loans (starting in
1971) and credit card interest rates (starting in 1990).23 As can be seen from Figure 6(a),
the CV for 24-month consumer loans increases from roughly 1.5 in the early 1970s to
about 3.0 by the late 1990s. A similar increase also occurs in credit cards.
The rise in dispersion has been accompanied by an increased spread between the
lowest and highest interest rates. Moreover, despite a decline in the the average (nomi-
nal) interest rate, the maximum rate charged by banks has actually increased (see Figure
6(b)). Thisincreasedgapbetweentheaverageandthemaximumratepointsisconsistent
with the comparative statics of the model.
Further details about the large shift in the distribution of credit card interest rates can
be gleaned from the empirical density of interest rates across households. Figure VII
displays the fraction of households reporting different interest rates in the SCF for 1983
and 2001. It is striking that in 1983 more than 50% of households faced a rate of exactly
18%.24 The 2001 distribution (and other recent years) is notably “ﬂatter” than that of
1983. Indeed, by 2001, no interest rate was reported by more than 12% of households.25
23We use data from the Quarterly Report of Interest Rates on Selected Direct Consumer Installment
Loans (LIRS) and the Terms of Credit Card Plans (TCCP). See Appendix B for a more details. Since each
bank can report only one (the most common) interest rate this likely understates the increase in options.
24This refers to the raw data: Figure VII aggregates interest rates into bins of one percentage points.
25A similar pattern holds for the distribution of interest rates on 24-months consumer loans.
265.2.2 Increased Risk Based Pricing
A second key prediction of all three ﬁnancial innovations is that more contracts should
be accompanied by better risk-based pricing. To see whether interest rates more ac-
curately reﬂect household risk, we compare the SCF distribution of interest rates for
households who were delinquent on at least one debt payment in the past year to non-
delinquents. Delinquency on debt is positively correlated with the probability of future
default, so delinquent households should be riskier than non-delinquents (Gross and
Souleles 2002). The top panel of Figure VII shows that the distributions of interest rates
for delinquents and non-delinquents was nearly identical in 1983. However, by 2001,
the delinquent interest rate distribution has considerable mass to the right of the non-
delinquent interest distribution (see bottom panel of Figure VII). This suggests that
credit card interest rates have become more closely related to borrowers default risk.
Several recent papers document similar ﬁndings. For example, Edelberg (2006) com-
bines data from the PSID and the SCF, and ﬁnds that lenders have become better at iden-
tifying higher risk borrowers and have made increased use of risk-based pricing. The
timing coincides with the observation that in the late 1980s some credit card banks be-
gan to offer more different credit card plans “targeted at selected subsets of consumers,
and many charge[d] lower interest rates” (Canner and Luckett 1992).26
5.2.3 Expansion of Credit to Lower Income Households
In the model, ﬁnancial innovations lead to an extension of credit to riskier borrowers.
We use SCF data to examine access to credit cards by income quintiles. Not surprisingly,
we ﬁnd a strong positive relationship between credit card ownership and borrowing for
all years. However, the positive relationship between credit card ownership/borrowing
and income in the SCF has become less pronounced in recent years. For example, in 1983
only 11% (4%) of households in the lowest income quintile owned a credit card (carried
a balance), versus 79% (37%) in the highest quintile. This gap narrowed considerably
during the 1990s. By 2004, card ownership for the lowest income quintile more than
tripled from 11% to 38% in 2004, while penetration for the top quintile increased to 96%.
This increase in access for lower income households has been accompanied by a sig-
niﬁcant increase in their share of total credit card debt outstanding. Figure 6(c) plots the
26Furletti and Ody (2006) report that credit card issuers also have made increased use of fees as ways
to impose a higher price on riskier borrowers.
27cdf for the share of total credit card balances held by various percentiles of the earned
income distribution in 1983 and 2004. The fraction of debt held by the bottom 30% (50%)
of earners nearly doubled from 6.1% (16.8%) in 1983 to 11.2% (26.6%) in 2004. Given that
the value of total credit card debt also increased, this implies that lower income house-
holds’ credit card debt increased signiﬁcantly.27 To the extent that lower income groups
are riskier, these ﬁndings suggest that borrowing by riskier households has increased
over the past two decades.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a qualitative incomplete markets model to explore the effect of ﬁ-
nancial innovations on unsecured consumer credit markets. This allows us to derive
predictions for how commonly discussed ﬁnancial innovations, based on improved in-
formation technology, impacts equilibrium credit contracts, borrowing, and defaults. To
evaluate these predictions, we assemble cross-sectional data on credit card interest rates
and the distribution of credit card borrowing over the past thirty years.
Our ﬁndings support the view that ﬁnancial innovations (likely due to improvements
in information technology) in the credit card market played a key role in the rise in un-
secured borrowing and bankruptcies over the past thirty years. Our model predicts that
ﬁnancialinnovationsleadtomorecreditcontracts, witheachcontracttargetedatsmaller
groups, and the extension of credit to riskier households. As a result, ﬁnancial innova-
tions lead to higher aggregate borrowing and defaults. We ﬁnd that these predictions
are surprisingly consistent with changes in the aggregate and cross-sectional pattern of
borrowing and defaults in the U.S. over the past twenty-ﬁve years.
The model implies that interpretations of the unsecured credit market using a “stan-
dard” competitive framework may be misleading. We ﬁnd that even a small ﬁxed cost
of creating a lending contract can lead to signiﬁcant deviations from the predictions of
the standard competitive framework. This suggests that incorporating ﬁxed costs into a
quantitative model could be a promising avenue for future research.
27Black and Morgan (1999), Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Surette (2000), Durkin (2000) also ﬁnd that
the most rapid increase in credit card usage and debt has been among lower income households.
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A Verifying Equilibrium under Incomplete Information
To verify that the allocation we have characterized is indeed an equilibrium, we need to
check that a potential entrant cannot make positive proﬁts by cream-skimming misclas-
siﬁed borrowers (by offering them (q′;L′) — a smaller risky loan with a better interest
rate).
The most proﬁtable potential deviation makes the best customer indifferent between




 q   
q′   
yl: (A.1)
Equation (A.1) establishes a simple relation between q′ and L′. The search for the most
proﬁtable deviation then amounts to searching over all possible q′. A single smaller
28Keeping the loan size ﬁxed, any lower price would imply losing the best and most numerous cus-
tomers, while any higher price would be leaving too much surplus to borrowers.
33risky loan may attract borrowers from a number of bins, and we thus have to calculate
(and sum over) the proﬁts generated from each of the equilibrium bins [n;n−1), for
n = 2;:::;N. It is important to note that any contract that attracts misclassiﬁed borrow-
ers necessarily disrupts the existing contract (into which these borrowers were misclas-
siﬁed). To see this, consider a contract (q′;L′) with L′ < yh and q′ > qn, which attracts
borrowers with ′ > ^ n. Since ′ prefers this contract to the risk-free contract, so will
every borrower with  < ′, including ^ n. Since ^ n is indifferent between the risk-free
contract and (qn;yh), she strictly prefers (q′;L′) to the existing contract (qn;yh).
Thus, for a given q′, and existing bin [n;n−1) served by (qn;yh), we have to con-
sider two possible scenario. First, the disruption to the existing contract may be small
enough that the incumbent lender chooses not to exit the market. This happens when
incumbent’s proﬁt loss is smaller than . Second, if the proﬁt loss from losing the best
(misclassiﬁed) customers is larger than , the incumbent lender will exit. Anticipating
this scenario, the entrant offers a replacement contract (q′
n;yh) to (correctly labeled)
customers with  2 [n;n−1) in order to prevent them from applying for the (q′;L′)
contract, which would make it unproﬁtable. If the entrant is unable to offer such a re-
placement contract, the entrant will avoid dealing with the bin [n;n−1) by setting the
eligibility requirement of the (q′;L′) contract to  = n−1.
We provide the details of the numerical implementation in a separate web appendix.
B Data Appendix
The Survey of Consumer Finance questions on the credit card interest rate of respon-
dents for 1995 - 2004 were for the card with the largest balance, while the 1983 survey
asked for the average annualized interest on the bank or store card used most often if
the full amount was not paid. When counting the number of different interest rates, we
drop imputed values. The sample size increases, but by much less than the reported
number of different interest rates (see the online appendix for the sample size by year).
In Figure 6(c), earned income is Wages + Salaries + Professional Practice, Business, Lim-
ited Partnership, Farm + Unemployment or Worker’s Compensation.
Figures 6(a) and 6(b) are based on surveys asking banks about interest rates charged
to consumers administered by the Board of Governors. The 24-months consumer loans
series is from the Quarterly Report of Interest Rates on Selected Direct Consumer Installment
34Loans (LIRS), and is available since February 1972 (coded as item LIRS7808). The sur-
vey asks for the most common (annual percentage) rate charged on “other loans for
consumer goods and personal expenditures (24-month).” It includes loans for goods
other than automobiles or mobile homes whether or not the loan is secured. Home im-
provement loans and loans secured primarily by real estate are excluded. The sample
declines from 296 banks in 1972 to 100 in 2007. The credit card interest rate data is from
the bi-annual (since 1990) Terms of Credit Card Plans (TCCP). We use series TCCP6258,



























Source: Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2010)
Figure I: Aggregate Facts
 Figure II: Illustration of Equilibrium Contracts with Imperfect Information
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Figure III: Varying the Fixed Cost
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Figure IV: Varying the Interest Rate
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Figure VII: Histogram of Interest Rates for Delinquents vs. Non-delinquents
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